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ABSTRACT Korea's developmental state had long maintained the principle of "separation be-
tween industrial capital and financial capital." whereby the nation's industrial conglomerates -
the chaebol - were restricted from having controlling ownership of financial institutions, espe-
cially banks. The financial crisis of 1997-98 renewed calls for regulating the chaebol, especially
in terms of reinforcing corporate governance and competition policy. This process was supported
and promoted by vibrant non-governmental organisations led by progressive activists who forged
an effective alliance with the government and the ruling party whose platform followed a populist
course. The reform movement has been resisted with equal fervour by conservative elements, led
by the opposition party, chaebol-supported think tanks, and the conservative media. This cleavage
is evident in the case of a pending legislation on chaebol ownership of financial institutions, the
Financial Industry Structure Law. The controversy over this proposed law demonstrates that
the contemporary chaebol reforms are deeply politicised. It also illustrates the path-dependent
nature of the government-chaebol relationship.
KEY WORDS: Chaebol, corporate governance, Financial Industry Structure Law,
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One of the crucial factors in the functioning of Korea's developmental state was the
government's near-total control of financial resources and credit (Jones and Sakong,
1980; Masons et al., 1980). Modern banks in Korea were created during Japanese
colonial rule and were mostly Japanese-owned. When Korea regained its
independence, the newly formed government took control of these banks and sold
them to wealthy businesses, but they were nationalised again after the military coup
of 1961. The ensuing industrialisation drive was financed by a state-allocated credit
system that utilised both foreign debt and financial resources at home (Cole and
Park, 1983; Zysman, 1983). Dozens oí chaebol were formed during the rapid growth
period through highly preferential treatment extended by the government to industry
champions (Woo, 1991).
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Chaebol are Korea's vertically integrated industrial conglomerate controlled by a
founding family. While the chaebol have hired an increasing number of professional
managers in recent years, family members continue to dominate the top executive
positions (Kim, 1991: 266-7). As an organisation, the chaebol mirror their Japanese
counterparts, which rely on a complex web of cross-company ownership to maintain
tight managerial control of their group companies (Chang, 2003). In one crucial
aspect, however, the chaebol and keiretsu can be distinguished: ready access to credit
through direct bank ownership, which played a central role in the keiretsu business
strategy and expansion, but not in the case of the chaebol. This was not by any design
on the part of the chaebol, they were simply forbidden from engaging in banking
business by the government. In fact, throughout most of Korea's modern economic
development, the wide-ranging restrictions on chaebol bank ownership helped ensure
that chaebol followed the dictates of the government.
The restriction on bank ownership provided "a separation between financial
capital and industrial capital," a phrase that represented an important policy
principle to prevent dominance by large non-financial industries ("industrial
capital") over the nation's financial industry. With private ownership of banks
effectively banned, the government had near-complete control of the financial
industry and its resources, which in turn served as an effective means to secure
chaebol compliance with the government's policy goals. In fact, in their early years,
the chaebol had little choice but to follow the government's industrial policy
faithfully in order to finance their expanding business through domestic financial
institutions, which the Finance Ministry regulated directly through compart-
mentalised markets with limited entry at the expense of competition (Park and
Patrick, 1994). Both foreign and domestic businesses were banned from the
financial sector, which stymied competition and has contributed to the weakness of
Korea's financial industry. Ironically, this weakness meant that the post-financial
crisis restructuring required a temporary nationalisation of bankrupted banks (Lee,
2002).
Certainly, many countries discourage non-financial businesses from acquiring a
controlling position in banks in order to prevent conflicts of interest. For example,
commercial companies may weaken banks if they seek to enhance their liquidity
through irregular lending practices by related banks. The chaebol ownership of
banks has been regarded as particularly risky in view of their overly aggressive
business strategies and the practice of expanding cross-shareholding equity positions
among intra-group companies (IMF, 2006; 37-8). The ban on direct bank ownership
was thus maintained as a principle from the early 1960s to the early 1980s, when the
Korean government began to allow limited ownership by setting a ceiling. Such was
not the case, however, for non-bank financial businesses, especially following a series
of financial liberalisations that began in the 1980s. The relaxed regulations on
chaebol ownership of non-bank financial companies have been seen as the main
culprit in the ability of chaebol to expand the so-called "circular pattern" of cross-
shareholding.
This article examines the history of the Korean government's attempt to regulate
chaeboFs ownership structure as a way of curbing economic concentration and the
response of chaebol in adapting to the regulatory environment. It presents a case
study of the attempt to revise the Finance Industry Structure Law (FISL) and
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analyses the coalition pattern among major policy actors surrounding chaebol
policies.
Evolution of Chaehot Corporate Ownership
By the mid-1980s, the chaebol, with 20 to 40 companies in each group, had become
domestic powerhouses that had transformed into fully-fledged multinational
corporations with billions of dollars in annual revenue (Kim, 2000). The pace of
their growth was such that by the mid-1980s, the top 50 chaebol accounted for
almost a fifth of Korea's gross domestic product and some 45% of mining and
manufacturing sales. This was achieved by aggressive diversification and expansion
into new industries, while forming oligopolist positions in major industries. The
average number of manufacturing businesses held by the top ten chaebol in 1983 was
8.6 and that of the top 20 chaebol was 6.6 (Zeile, 1991: 306),
From the mid-1980s, the Korean government began to take more seriously the
myriad of problems deriving from the organisational expansion oi chaebol. From the
perspective of the well-being of the national economy, the ever-increasing gap
between chaebol and smaller businesses heightened the problem of economic
injustice. Furthermore, the common chaebol practice of propping up unprofitable
businesses through the support of other, profitable firms caused serious problems in
resource allocation, while redundant investments in manufacturing businesses led to
considerable overcapacity in some industries. To address these problems, the
government had to switch its policy on chaebol from the traditional practice of
extending subsidies and favours to one that invoked sanctions and regulations.
The chaeboFs ownership structure was called into question first. In 1986, the
revised Fair Trade Act banned additional cross-shareholding of intra-group
companies for chaebol whose assets amounted to more than two billion Korean
won. Under this "cross-shareholding restriction rule" [sangho chulja Jehan je],
between 30 and 40 top chaebol have been subjected to monitoring by the Fair Trade
Commission (FTC), In the same year, the government introduced a new regulation
called "equity investment sum caption rule" [chulja chongakje], restricting the total
sum of intra-corporate investment by chaebol companies. The top chaebol (initially
defined as companies with assets in excess of 400 billion won, and later assets in
excess of six trillion won) were not allowed to invest more than 40% of their net
assets in group subsidiaries, and this ceiling was further reduced to 25% during the
fourth revision of the Fair Trade Act (FTA) in 1994. In 1998, however, this
regulation was abolished temporarily in order to accelerate corporate restructuring
after the financial crisis. A year later, the restriction was reintroduced but it
exempted those chaebol that demonstrated "good" corporate governance. Its most
recent revision, made in April 2007, relaxed the equity sum caption rule by moving
up the scale of chaebol's assets to ten trillion won and the ceiling of its intra-group
investment to 40% of its net assets {Hankuk Kyungje [Seoul], 3 April 2007).
Despite these restrictions, the extent of chaebol cross-shareholding remained high.
Thirty-eight chaebol were subject to the cross-shareholding restriction rule in both
2005 and 2006. The average level of cross-shareholding is about 51% of their
member companies' total shares. The total shareholdings of the owner and his or her
family are less than 5% but cross-shareholdings of member companies stood at
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around 44%. Nine chaebol were designated as large enterprise groups whose total
equity investment was limited in both years. Their total cross-shareholding was 47%
in 2005 and 48% in 2006. Again, owner family's total shares were only 4.6%, but
about 41% of inter-corporate investment among group companies maintains
chaeboFs group solidarity (Table 1).
The financial crisis radically altered the government-chaebol relationship. The
generally positive public image of chaebol as national champions and exclusive
family businesses became a negative one, as they were discredited by the events of the
crisis, being seen as irresponsible and anti-social, and thus undeserving of protection.
According to analysts, such as Kang (2000) and Haggard (2000), prior to the crisis,
the deregulation of financial and capital markets created a "moral hazard,"
permitting excessive lending for the expansion of the chaebol. An inñow of large
amounts of speculative capital and a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade by the
late 1990s left the Korean economy vulnerable to external shocks, eventually falling
victim to the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Much of the blame for the crisis was
sheeted home to mismanagement by incompetent members of chaebol-founding
families, with particularly severe criticism directed at the ownership structure of
chaebol.
Responding to the crisis, strong monitoring activities and new competition policies
were introduced under the new Kim Dae-jung government. The chaebol were now
portrayed as barriers to the development of a fair and competitive market system.
Foreign direct investment was courted actively and foreign businesses were even seen
as a force to counteract the dominance of chaebol (Lee and Han, 2006). Newly
empowered non-governmental organisations (NGOs) forged a close relationship
with the government in advocating reform of chaebol corporate governance. Chaebol
that survived the harsh corporate restructuring following the Asian crisis improved
their financial conditions by restraining diversification ambitions and their corporate
governance became more transparent due to monitoring mechanisms (Choe and
Pattnaik, 2007). Nevertheless, the dominance of founding family management still
remains unchanged so that chaebol's corporate governance is subject to the scrutiny
of NGOs.
The populist desire to discipline the chaebol was fuelled further under the
succeeding President, Roh Moo-hyun, who was elected on the basis of his image as
an outsider politician and an anti-establishment voice. The Roh government
intensified chaebol reforms, investigating their illegal political funding and
accounting irregularities, while pressuring them to improve their corporate
governance. The calls for chaebol reforms became louder after the newly established
ruling Wood party won a majority in the National Assembly after the General
Election in April 2004. The revision of the FISL, in particular, showcased the
effectiveness of the coalition between the regulatory government and progressive
politicians and NGOs.
Adapting to Government Ownership Regulations
Although the Korean government has sought to limit collusion between financial
capital and industrial capital, chaebol financial institutions quickly diversified to
include insurance, securitie, and investment and trust banking. In the early 1980s, the
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Table 1, Korean chaebol ownership structure
Chaebol
subject to
cross-
shareholding
restrictions
Chaebol
subject
to total
investment
limit
Year
2005
2006
2005
2006
Owner
Chairman
2,01
2,00
1,83
1,72
family total
Relatives
2,92
2,89
2,82
2,92
Sub-
total
4,94
4,89
4,64
4,64
Other
Group
firms
43,98
44,08
40,69
41,54
than owner
family
Other
2,30
2,31
1,80
2,02
Sub-
total
46,28
46,39
42,49
43,56
Total
cross-
shareholdings
51,21
51,27
47,14
48,20
Source: Fair Trade Commission (2005; 2006),
government began to divest its holdings in commercial banks but had set an 8%
ceiling on ownership for any single individual or business group. This restriction,
however, did not extend to the life insurance business, allowing several chaebol to
assume control of large insurance companies. At a later date, the limit on bank
ownership was reduced further to 4%. When the Banking Law was revised in April
2002 to raise the limit to 10%, restrictions on the chaebol remained. Specifically,
while any individual - foreign or Korean national - may purchase up to 10% of a
bank's shares, in the case of a chaebol, their voting rights are limited to 4%.
Since the tightening of regulations of cross-shareholdings in the late 1980s, a
number of chaebol tried to circumvent these restrictions by developing an even more
complex "circular" system of cross-shareholding among intra-group companies. In
this new system, their newly acquired financial institutions came to play a key
linkage role. Among the 38 chaebol subject to cross-shareholding restriction in April
2005, 23 of them own financial institutions as part of their group. Of these, 13 have
significantly incorporated financial institutions into their group. Table 2 shows that
the 29 financial or insurance companies that belong to these 13 chaebol have invested
2430 billion won (about a 70 billion won increase over 2004) in their intra-group
companies. Each chaebol-owned financial or insurance company holds an average of
12.58% (a 2,64% increase from the 2004 average) of shares in 78 intra-group
companies, Samsung Group owns five financial institutions but the size of their
capital investment is substantial, accounting for half of the total held by all 13
chaebol financial institutions. Those five institutions have investments in 27 intra-
group companies, suggesting that the Samsung Group is actively combining finance
capital with its industrial capital, relative to other chaebol groups. Due to this
corporate governance structure, Samsung Group has been the target of tight
government monitoring and intense protests by progressive NGOs.
The chaebol-owned financial institutions have also been investing in their major
industrial groups. As seen in Table 3, Samsung Card holds about a quarter of
Samsung Everland, which belongs to the Samsung Group. Samsung Life Insurance
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Table 2. Intra-group investment by chaebol-owned financial insurance companies,
1 April 2005
Chaebol
Samsung
Dongyang
Dongbu
Hyundai Auto.
Hanhwa
CJ
Hyundai Heavy
Industry
SK
Lotte
Taekwang
Hyundai
Geumho
Kolon
Total
No. of
intra-group
financial
institutions
(IGFIs)
5
6
4
1
2
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
29
No. of
intra-groups
companies
27
12
9
4
6
1
2
5
2
4
3
1
2
78
Volume
of capital
investment
by IGFI
(billion won)
1275.6
614.3
144.9
122.7
112.2
62.5
32.5
29.5
17.4
9.2
5.8
2.4
0.7
2430.7
Average %
share of IGFIs
in intra-group
companies of
each chaebol
16.40
42.74
9.32
4.67
2.76
91.80
65.03
2.62
4.54
16.12
6.15
6.24
2.50
12.58
Source: Fair Trade Commission (2005).
Chaebol
Table 3. Intra-group investments by chaebol financial institutions
Major chaebol companies owned by intra-group financial institutions
T7 1 1 /O / ^ 1 '^ e /' Á l\ / \Samsung Everland (Samsung Card 25.64%)
Samsung Electronics (Samsung Life 7.23%, Samsung Fire and
Marine Co. 1.26%)
Samsung Corporation (Samsung Life 4.8%, Samsung Investment
Trust Management 0.10%)
SK SK (SK Life 0.47%)
SK Telecom (SK Life 0.01%)
Hanhwa Hanhwa (Hanhaw Securities Co. 4.94%)
Dongbu Dongbu Corporation (Dongbu Life 9.46%, Dongbu Insurance 13.73%)
Dongyang Dongyang Leisure (Dongyang Capital 35%), Dongyang Major
(Dongyang Life 1.63%)
Taekwang Taekwang Industrial Co. (Hungkuk Life Insurance 9.99%)
Source: Fair Trade Commission (2005).
and Samsung Fire and Marine Insurance hold 7.23% and 1.26%, respectively, of
Samsung Electronics. Samsung Life Insurance and Samsung Investment Trust
Management Co. hold 4.8% and 0.1%, respectively, of Samsung Corporation.
Dongbu Life Insurance and Dongbu Insurance hold 9.46% and 13.73%,
respectively, of shares of Dongbu Corporation, which is the Group's construction
arm. Dongyang Capital holds 35% of Dongyang Leisure.
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Thus, Korea's 14 largest chaebol, with more than 5000 billion won in assets, have
found an effective means of bypassing regulations on intra-group investments in the
form of a "circular pattern" of investments using in-house financial institutions.
Each circle of intra-group investment includes several companies and major chaebol
groups have several circles. For example, Samsung Everland holds 19.34% of shares
of Samsung Life, which holds 4.8% of Samsung Corporation, which holds 1.48% of
Samsung Everland. The circle continues as Samsung Corporation holds 4.02% of
Samsung Electronics, which owns 20.38% of Samsung SDI, which then owns 4%
of Samsung Everland. Similar practices are carried out by other major chaebol.
Hyundai Motor Company owns 38.67% of Kia Motors Co., which in turn owns
18.19% of Hyundai MOBIS, which has again 14.59% of Hyundai Motor Company.
Hanhwa Corporation has 24.21% of Hanhwa Petrochemical, which owns 100%
shares of Hanhwa L&C Co. It again holds 6.44% of Hanwha Securities Co., which
owns 4.94% of Hanhwa Corporation (Kim, 2006: 36-7).
As this kind of circular investment pattern developed, the government began to
reinforce rules restricting collusion between financial and non-financial businesses.
The ruling party and progressive civic movement organisations took a more critical
approach and pushed the pragmatic-minded bureaucrats to come up with a viable
reinforcement. It is against this background that the FISL has undergone a highly
contested policy co-ordination and revision process.
The Financial Industry Structure Law
The revision of the FISL was one of the most politically controversial and contested
issues in recent memory. The law was renamed in March 1997 to replace the existing
Law on Merger and Transfer of Financial Industry. A key revision included an
article that regulates investments by financial companies in non-financial businesses.
Specifically, the article requires a financial company to obtain approval from the
Minster of Finance and Economy (from May 1999, the Chairman of the Financial
Supervisory Commission) if it intends to acquire 5% or more of the shares of a
company belonging to the same business group; for companies not belonging to the
same group, the limit is 20%. In January 2000, measures specifying fines for
violation of this regulation were added.
FISL was the key piece of legislation designed to implement the policy principle of
separation between financial capital and industrial capital by restricting directly the
circular investment pattern of chaebol companies. For some years following the
Asian financial crisis, during which Korea's financial industry was undergoing
unprecedented restructuring under the IMF-mandated financial reform drive, FISL
received little attention. By 2004, however, it became one of the most hotly contested
issues in Korean politics, with all the key players - the government, political parties,
business, and civic movement organisations - fully engaged in the dynamic game of
formulating new rules on the chaebol and their financial institutions.
Party Politics and the FISL
In April 2004 the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)' conducted a
comprehensive probe into the activities of financial companies and reported that
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ten companies were in violation of the FISL. This finding brought immediate public
criticism that the existing penalties were too lenient to curb the illegal shareholding
practices. Hardliners in the ruling Woori Party took the offensive, calling the law too
soft and prompting the government to draft a revised FISL that was passed by the
Cabinet on 5 July 2005. The government's revision included a "grandfather clause"
that allowed the violation of the 5% ceiling if the shares were acquired before the
introduction ofthe law (in March 1997). If not, however, no voting rights beyond
5% would be recognised.
Dissatisfied with government's revised draft, a number of parties proposed
alternative drafts. The Woori Party independently drafted a revised FISL banning
voting rights regardless of acquisition dates and requiring any company in violation
of the new law to sell its excessive share over the next five years. A failure to comply
would subject the company to daily fines. Even when excessive shareholding was
approved by the government in cases of restructuring or a merger, the draft law
would have required a financial company to seek new approval when the
shareholding reached 25% and then again when it reached 33%. The Democratic
Labor Party (DLP) also submitted its own revised draft, sharing the Woori Party's
views and being even tougher by shortening the grace period for excessive
shareholding to two years. In contrast, the major opposition Grand National Party
(GNP) criticised both FISL revisions submitted by the government and other
parties. It argued that government draft was too harsh in banning voting rights for
excessive shares. As for the drafts of both the Woori Party and DLP, it criticised the
elimination of the grandfather clause as essentially unconstitutional and said that
limiting voting rights was sufficient rather than requiring the mandatory sale of
excessive shares, which was an infringement of property rights. But, the GNP did not
make this opposition position on the FISL its official party platform for fear of
popular criticism of being lenient towards the chaebol. In June 2006, however, the
GNP members in the Finance and Economic Committee of the National Assembly
expressed interest in raising the shareholding ceiling to 10% for all companies,
including the chaebol; the existing law allows 10% ownership only for foreign or
domestic financial companies {Money Today, 27 June 2006).
With increasing controversy over the law's revision, by October 2005 the Blue
House (Office of the President) intervened with a compromise position, stating that
the acquisition of excessive shareholdings before the FISL's introduction should be
allowed and that only those shares acquired after the law's enactment needed to
be sold. Despite the Blue House's attempt at a compromise, the government and
the ruling Woori Party were unable to narrow their differences.^  The Blue House
came in to mediate this confiict and, in late November 2005, the Woori Party
recommended that those companies that acquired excessive shares before the law's
enactment would be allowed to keep them and would only face a restriction on
voting rights. At the same time, any excessive shares acquired after the law's
enactment would have to be sold (Woori Party, 2005). This new draft finally passed
in the Committee on Finance and Economy on 27 February 2006 after ten months of
debate in the Assembly following the government's submission of an earlier draft in
November 2004. Nevertheless, ambiguity and confusion remained regarding the
ultimate ceiling of ownership acquired before the law's enactment. The last
government FISL draft stipulated that this law is subject to Article 11 of the Fair
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Trade Act specifying that financial or insurance companies could have a voting right
up to the total sum of 15% shares of all intra-group companies in the case of a
merger or a business transfer.
Political controversy has not ended, however, and the prospect for the law's
ultimate passage remains uncertain. The Assembly's Finance and Economy
Committee passed the draft with a margin of just one vote. The draft was expected
to be passed in the April 2006 session of the National Assembly after the Judicial
Committee's voting but the Assembly ended its regular session before doing so.
The Assembly has yet to resume debate on the law and is unlikely to do so until
after the December 2007 presidential election. The fate of the FISL will likely depend
on the new government's policy approach on chaebol.
The Samsung Group and the Korean Business Community
The corporate governance of the Samsung Group emerged as the focal point in the
controversy surrounding the revision of the FISL. When investigations were
conducted into the financial companies of leading chaebol groups, Dongbu Group
and Hyundai Group were also found to have violated the law. However, the move to
reinforce the FISL soon became intermingled with highly public criticism of
Samsung's corporate governance. Samsung Everland, in which Chairman Lee Kun-
hee and his son Lee Jae-Yong hold 3.72% and 25.1% of total shares, respectively,
was charged with maintaining a key position in the Group using the circular
investment strategy with intra-group financial institutions. Samsung Card owns
25.64% of the shares of Everland, which owns 13.35% of Samsung Life Insurance's
shares. Samsung Life Insurance again owns 7.24% of shares of Samsung Electronics,
which owns 46.9% of total shares of Samsung Card. Thus, Samgsung Card is in
obvious violation of the FISL by owning 20% more shares of Everland than is
legally allowed, while Samsung Life Insurance has an excessive holding of 2.24% of
Samsung Electronics' shares. If the revised FISL were to be enacted, within two
years Samsung Life Insurance would lose 2.24% of its voting rights, representing the
excessive shares of Samsung Electronics. But, it would be able to keep the excessive
shares since they were acquired in 1998, before the introduction of the original FISL.
On the other hand, Samsung Card's purchase of Everland shares occurred after the
law's enactment, so that it would have to sell the excessive 20.64% of Everland
shares within five years, in addition to the immediate nullification of its voting rights
for the same excessive amount in the management decisions of Everland.
The nullification of voting rights of Samsung Life Insurance was criticised by both
the business community and the GNP, since the revised FISL would penalise
purchases made before the inception of the original FISL. The business community
formally expressed concern over the finance industry's competitiveness through its
lobbying arm, the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI). Specifically, its research
body, the Korea Economic Research Institute (KERI), raised the issue of the
vulnerability of Korean business to hostile takeovers by large foreign merger and
acquisition firms. If Samsung Life Insurance's voting right for the excessive 2.24%
share of Samsung Electronics was nullified, the Group's total share in Samsung
Electronics would be reduced to 13.81%, weakening its influence over Samsung
Electronics and exposing it to takeover. Although the Samsung Group can increase
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its combined shares in Samsung Electronics, this option is regarded as too expensive
for the Group since each share of the Electronics costs about 700,000 won. The
business community also protested that the revised FISL discriminated against
domestic businesses in favour of foreign businesses, which do not face the same
restrictions, KERI further stated that the revised FISL is likely to slow down the
merger of financial institutions considered necessary for strengthening the financial
industry's competitiveness. For example, Samsung Securities, Samsung Futures, and
Samsung Investment Trust Management, each of which had less than 5% of the
stocks of the Group's digital camera company Samsung Techwon, would have no
incentive to merge since their maximum total share in Samsung Techwon would be
reduced to 5% if they did so, rather than the combined 15% now (Lee and Kim,
2005),
Samsung Group had strenuously opposed the move to reinforce the FISL
throughout 2004, By 2005, however, the Group had experienced a number of legal
setbacks, which produced an enormous negative public reaction. First, the courts
ruled against the top managers of Everland for incurring significant loss by issuing
convertible bonds at a deflated price to Lee Jae-yong, the Samsung Chairman's son,
in 1996, The case was first brought by the People's Solidarity for Participatory
Democracy (PSPD), which viewed the sale of the bonds as an illegal and unethical
manoeuvre to accomplish dynastic succession. The Group Chairman himself was
involved in a separate investigation into charges of high-level corruption. Facing
mounting public criticism and pressure, the Chairman announced that he would
donate 800 billion won of his personal wealth to "social causes," in a typical chaebol
move to ameliorate negative publicity and the subsequent worsening group image. In
the face of these setbacks, the Group withdrew its opposition to the revised FISL
and formally took the position that it would comply with the new law if it was
enacted,
Korean Civil Society and NGOs
Korean civil society has long been divided over the issues related to social and
economic reforms, and their actions and reactions to these reforms reflect the
existing cleavage. Progressives have emphasised distribution over growth and
addressed the need to control business concentration into bigger companies. On the
other hand, conservatives have argued for further growth and government
deregulation to boost the market. Progressive NGOs have been most active in
monitoring chaeboPs corporate governance and pressuring the government for more
reforms on the chaebol and their activities. The Citizens' Coalition for Economic
Justice (CCEJ) and PSPD are the major civic movement organisations advocating
economic reform,^  PSPD, in particular, has been an ardent chaebol reformer.
Established in 1994 by progressive lawyers and professors, PSPD has played the role
of challenger to chaebol management and ownership structure. Its most high-profile
activity has been the "small shareholders movement," Initiated in 1997, the
movement succeeded for the first time in gathering sufiicient minority votes to call a
general shareholders' meetings, in which they began to regularly and effectively
challenge the top management of many chaebol, including such giants as Samsung
Electronics,
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PSPD has also been highly critical of the Ministry of Finance and Economy
(MOFE) for its FISL enforcement - or lack thereof - especially toward the
Samsung Group. Immediately upon the passage of the revised FISL by the Cabinet
in early July of 2005, PSPD's Economic Reform Center Chief Kim Sang-jo (2005a)
criticised the government for abandoning the principle of the separation between
financial capital and industrial capital and sacrificing market order to guarantee
the Samsung's management control by its founding family. He also accused the
MOFE of effectively sanctioning the Group's various illegal share acquisitions by
adding exemptions in the revisions (Kim, 2005b). The government's final draft of
the FISL submitted to the National Assembly did not satisfy the PSPD either,
which argued that the new law should not provide any grace period for voting
right restrictions. It was particularly critical of the position of MOFE where it
defended the grace period on the grounds that, beginning in April 2008, another
law (Article 11 of Fair Trade Act) would restrict all combined shares of Samsung
financial institutions in Samsung Electronics to 15% (PSDP, 2006a). PSPD also
argued that the revised FISL should not be passed in its current form since
Samsung Life Insurance would be exempt from the law's compulsory release of
excessive shares and Samsung Card would be allowed to have five years of grace
period (PSDP, 2006b).
In sharp contrast, pro-business NGOs were critical of the revised FISL for its
infringement of private property rights and its retroactive enforcement. The Institute
of Free Enterprise provided the main voice in this regard. It has vigorously opposed
the nullification of the voting rights of Samsung Life Insurance's excessive
shareholdings in Samsung Electronics, maintaining that mandatory stock sales of
Everland shares by Samsung Card would be unconstitutional since the original FISL
did not contain such a rule. It further argued that there is no such thing as
"desirable" corporate governance and, if there were, it would only be to make profits
(Institute for Free Enterprise, 2006a). Another Institute for Free Enterprise (2006b)
commentary critically pointed out that the FISL revision is redundant and excessive
because it adds more regulations on top of the Fair Trade Act, which it considers
already harsh. It calls for a change in anti-chaebol sentiments that give rise to today's
anti-business regulations. A research organisation run by the Hyundai Group echoes
these sentiments, warning that stepping up the separation between financial capital
and industrial capital will severely weaken the domestic capital market (Hyundai
Economic Research Institute, 2005).
The Korea Institute of Finance (KIF) (2006: 135-9), established in 1991 by Korean
banks, takes the position of essentially supporting the revised FISL. It sees the
revision as being desirable in simplifying the regulations of the financial industry,
which needs to be kept separated from industrial capital. In doing so, KIF is
reflecting the interests of the Korean banking sector, which is mindful of the
intrusion of chaebol into the financial industry.
Conclusion
Recent political entanglements over the revised FISL demonstrate the cleavages that
have developed in reforming corporate governance in the chaebol. Policy actors such
as ruling Woori Party politicians and progressive civic movement organisations had
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taken the lead in criticising the chaebol and the government's tendency to
compromise with them. They emphasise that their ownership structures are often
illicit and are essentially undemocratic and must be reformed for the sake of fair
competition and a stable market. On the other hand, liberal advocacy NGOs and
think tanks representing chaebol interests defend them by emphasising free market
principles and private property rights as well as the need for pragmatism and gradual
reform. They include opposition party politicians who advocate improving the
competitiveness of the financial industry by allowing increased chaebol investments.
They stress that the principle of separation between financial capital and industrial
capital is outdated and meaningless in today's universal banking system. The
symbiotic government-business relationship, captured in the "Korea Inc," model,
had broken up through the process of démocratisation, deregulation and
globalisation. The Korean government is increasingly taking up reform measures
for democratic governance vis-à-vis the chaebol. With market opening pressure from
foreigners, the government had liberalised the economy and eliminated rents that
used to be channelled to the chaebol. At the same time, the chaebol themselves
had become internationally competitive and more independent of government
protection or subsidies. The 1997 financial crisis sorted out the weaker chaebol and
the surviving chaebol have been successful in taking advantage of new business
opportunities.
Despite encompassing economic reforms, both the government's regulations of
chaebol and chaebol responses to these regulations demonstrate their path-dependent
evolution. The government has built a complex regulatory regime that is often
internally contradictory or redundant, leading to a patchwork of regulations that
have resulted not only from the need to reform but also from an institutional inertia
trying to maintain bureaucratic discretionary power. Complying with changing
government regulations, the chaebol corporate governance has been quite successful
in adapting to the evolving regulatory environment that was intended to be hostile to
the management succession of the founding family. The institutional legacies of the
developmental state and large business conglomerates are not likely to disappear in
the near future; they will likely continue to evolve according to a changing economic
environment.
Civil society, while sharing the sentiments and enthusiasm for reform, is divided
over how to reform the chaebol corporate governance. Progressive civic movement
organisations had demonstrated their capability in making their voices heard and
even submitting their own reform proposals. In spite of differences and frequent
conflicts, they have successfully forged a coahtion with the reform forces in the
government and the ruling party. In recent years, however, reform fatigue and weak
economic performance have dampened their popular appeal. Still, traditional liberal
voices critical of the government's regulations of chaebol have been unable to
significantly defuse or redirect popularly held negative sentiments. It remains to be
seen whether the possible power shift to the opposition party in the 2007 presidential
election will reshape the delicate balance of the current social cleavages surrounding
chaebol reforms. Whoever is in power, however, the developmental state is likely to
maintain chaebol regulations to some extent, while the chaebol will continue to
upgrade their corporate governance structure to their advantage. The game will
go on.
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Notes
' The FSC was created in April 1998 as an independent and superior decision body to integrate
supervisory functions that had been scattered throughout several compartmentalised financial
authorities. It is responsible for the promulgation and amendment of financial supervisory rules and
regulations, the approval and permission for the business of financial institutions, and the deliberation
and resolution ofthe supervisory agenda with respect to any inspections, examinations and sanctions on
financial institutions.
^ The apparent contradiction between the government and the ruling party can be understood if it is
considered that government policy was planned by career bureaucrats who were more willing to accept
free market and restrain excessive chaebol regulation. On the other hand, the ruling Woori Party
politicians were eager to control the expansion of chaebol into the financial industry.
•* For an overview of their activities, see their websites: http://www.ccej.or.kr and http://www.
peoplepower21 .org.
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